As a new term begins, good news comes from SoE faculty’s research papers: three papers authored by SoE faculty members, Prof. Sambuddha Ghosh’s “Intimidation: Linking Negotiation and Conflict” (co-authored), Prof. Simin He’s “The Power and Limits of Sequential Communication in Coordination Game” (co-authored) and Prof. Yan Zhang’s “The good, the bad and the ugly: Chinese imports, European Union anti-dumping measures and firm performance” (co-authored), have recently been accepted for publication in top-field journals, International Economic Review、Journal of Economic Theory and Journal of International Economics, respectively. Their publications make a very strong start for this year’s faculty publication in top academic journals.
Sambuddha Ghosh, Associate Professor, PhD (Princeton University): His research interest concerns economic theory, game theory and political economy. In 2015, he was appointed as an associate professor on Tenure-track by SoE. He previously taught at Boston University and have published papers in many journals, such as AEJ: Microeconomics.
Simin He, Associate Professor, PhD (University of Amsterdam): Her research interest concerns behavioral economics, experimental economics, and game theory. She was appointed as a “Tenure-track” assistant professor in SoE in 2016 and has since made outstanding achievements in research, having two papers published in Management Science and Games and Economic Behavior. Showing strong research momentum, she is currently a key member of Behavior and Experimental Economics research team in SoE.
Zhang Yan, Associate Professor, PhD (University of Hong Kong): Her research interest concerns international economics and Chinese economy. Since joining SoE in 2013, she has two co-authored papers published in International Economics and Journal of Comparative Economics.
Abstracts of Three Papers：
Intimidation: Linking Negotiation and Conflict
Sambuddha Ghosh, Gabriele Gratton, Caixia Shen
Abstract: A challenger wants a resource initially held by a defender, who can negotiate a settlement by offering to share the resource. If challenger rejects, conflict ensues. During conflict each player could be a tough type for whom fighting is costless. Therefore non-concession intimidates the opponent into conceding. Unlike in models where negotiations happen in the shadow of exogenously specified conflicts, the rejected offer determines how conflict is played if negotiations fail. In turn, how players are expected to play during conflict determines their negotiating positions. In equilibrium, negotiations always fail with positive probability, even if players face a high cost of conflict. Allowing multiple offers leads to brinkmanship—the only acceptable offer is the one made when conflict is imminent. If negotiations fail, conflict is prolonged and non-duration dependent.
The Power and Limits of Sequential Communication in Coordination Game
SiminHe,Theo Offerman,Jeroenvan de Ven
Abstract: We study theoretically and experimentally the extent to which communication can solve coordination problems when there is some conflict of interest. We investigate various communication protocols, including one in which players chat sequentially and free-format. We develop a model based on the ‘feigned-ignorance principle’, according to which players ignore any communication unless they reach an agreement in which both players are (weakly) better off. With standard preferences, the model predicts that communication is effective in Battle-of-the-Sexes but futile in Chicken. A remarkable implication is that increasing players' payoffs can make them worse off, by making communication futile. Our experimental findings provide strong support for these and some other predictions.
The good, the bad and the ugly: Chinese imports, European Union anti-dumping measures and firm performance
LizaJabbour,ZhigangTao,EnricoVanino,YanZhang
Abstract：This paper analyses the effects of the European Union's anti-dumping tariffs against Chinese imports on all affected firms: “the good” European import-competing firms, “the bad” Chinese exporters and “the ugly” European importers of dumped products. The results show that temporary import tariffs are beneficial to the least productive “good” EU producers, but harms the most productive “ugly” EU importers. Overall, the net effects of anti-dumping policy on European employment and exports are largely negative. Also tariffs enhance the productivity of surviving “bad” Chinese exporters and widens the productivity gap with European competitors.
