Associate Professor Sambuddha Ghosh recently had a paper published in the Economic Theory, a tier-two journal in SUFE list. The paper, titled“Prior-free online Mechanisms for Queueing with Arrivals”, was coauthored with Dr. Yan Long and Dr. Manipushpak Mitra.
Abstract
Agents from a finite population arrive at various discrete times, and exit after they use a server for one period each. Each agent has a per-period cost of queueing, which constitutes his private information. Among direct mechanisms that are prior-free, i.e. independent of distributions of arrivals and costs, and online, i.e. charge only those present in the system, we characterize the class of dynamically strategy-proof mechanisms with least total waiting cost. The budget is balanced eventually under a mild condition on the arrival sequence, while a canonical mechanism that achieves budget balance in each period is also characterized under a stronger condition.
Associate Professor Sambuddha Ghosh joined the SOE as a tenure-track faculty member in 2015. He holds a PhD in economics from Princeton University and his primary area of research is microeconomic theory and game theory. He has been awarded a grant by the National Natural Science Foundation of China.
