Assistant Professor Shuguang Zhu has his paper accepted for publication by American Economic Journal-Microeconomics, a first-tier journal as listed by SUFE. The paper entitled “On the Foundations of Ex Post Incentive Compatible Mechanisms”was co-authored with Dr. Takuro Yamashita.
Abstract
This paper considers an interdependent-value robust mechanism design problem, where the principal has little knowledge about the agent's belief. Although ex post incentive compatible (EPIC) mechanisms can implement allocations without any knowledge about the agent's belief, we show that, under certain condition (order-reversing interdependence), there exists a non-EPIC mechanism that achieves a strictly higher expected revenue than any EPIC mechanism, given whatever the (admissible) belief structure the agent may enjoy. Conversely, with sufficiently small interdependence, such a non-EPIC mechanism does not exist: For some (admissible) belief structure, an EPIC mechanism achieves the highest expected revenue.
Assistant Professor Shuguang Zhu joined the SOE as a tenure-track faculty member in 2018. He holds a PhD in economics from Toulouse School of Economics and his primary area of research is microeconomic theory including, but not restricted to, mechanism design theory, information design and collective decision-making.
