Recently, the co-authored paper Optimal Design of Market Access by Tenured Associate Professor Shuguang Zhu from the Department of Microeconomics, School of Economics, Shanghai University of Finance and Economics, has been officially published in American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, a top-tier international economics journal.
Abstract
We study a data provider's problem of optimally designing and selling marketing lists that enable a retailer with private types to access consumers with heterogeneous characteristics. When virtual values satisfy a particular form of convexity (named boundary dominance), under certain regularity conditions, the optimal mechanism comprises fully revealing marketing lists, irrespective of whether the retailer's types are vertically or horizontally ordered. Moreover, in the vertical case, the optimal mechanism allows a simple "fixed-price" implementation. In the horizontal case, it exhibits no-exclusion and rotation properties. Conversely, if boundary dominance is violated, the optimal mechanism may not be fully revealing.
Shuguang Zhu received his Ph.D. in Economics from the Toulouse School of Economics in France. He is currently Tenured Associate Professor at the School of Economics, Shanghai University of Finance and Economics. His main research fields include microeconomic theory, mechanism design and information design. His research papers have appeared in journals such as Journal of Economic Theory, American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, and Social Choice and Welfare.
