Recently, the co-authored paper "An observability paradox in linked enforcement" by Zheng Bingyong, tenured associate professor in the Department of
Microeconomics at the School of Economics, Shanghai University of Finance and Economics, was officially published in the first-tier international journal
Games and Economic Behavior.
Paper Abstract
The presence of observation errors limits players' ability to detect deviations, and hence the possibility of efficient cooperation in repeated games. When
players interact repeatedly in multiple games with imperfect observation in at least one game, however, we find a novel spillover effect that enhances
players' ability to sustain cooperation. This finding suggests the presence of observation error can increase the likelihood of efficient cooperation when
players interact in multiple repeated games simultaneously. Our result has important implications for industrial organizations, relational contracts, and
international cooperation.
Author Profile
Zheng Bingyong is a tenured associate professor at the School of Economics. He is mainly engaged in research on game theory, industrial organization,
and relational contracts. He has published multiple articles in international journals such as Games and Economic Behavior, the RAND Journal of
Economics, Economic Theory, and the Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. This paper is his second published in Games and Economic
Behavior. He has presided over one General Program project of the National Natural Science Foundation of China and participated in two others.
